Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Processor CEC 1702

článek ve sborníku ve WoS nebo Scopus

angličtina

Cryptography is omnipresent in our daily life, as we need it for trusted authentication (e.g., in access systems), secure communication, ensuring data integrity and confidentiality, and many more. However, even if mathematically secure ciphers are used, the device running the cryptographic algorithms is still vul-nerable to side-channel attacks that may reveal the secrets. These attacks exploit the fact that power consumption or electromagnetic emanation of the device depends on processed data. To prevent such an attack, the designer must employ countermeasures, such as masking, hiding, or shuffling. In this paper, we focus on Microchip CEC1702 microcontroller that supports common cryptographic operations in hardware. We analyze the resistance of its AES accelerator against correlation power analysis (CPA). We analyzed 100 million power traces by first-order CPA and univariate second-order CPA. In neither case did we find any vulnerability.

AES; CEC1702; ChipWhisperer; CPA; Higher-order CPA; PicoScope; SICAK; Side-channel attacks

HORNÍČKOVÁ, T.; PŘEUČIL, T.; NOVOTNÝ, M.; MARTINÁSEK, Z.

10. 6. 2023

IEEE

Budva, Montenegro

9798350322910

12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing, MECO 2023

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